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People Smuggling in Afghanistan and Niger:  
Iatrogenesis and Europe’s “Migration Crisis”  
With migration, immigration, and human movement as topics of growing international 
concern, the collective tendency is to misconstrue and generalize certain concepts. This 
perpetuates a narrative that fits within a predetermined, generally Eurocentric, framework of 
global understanding. That Europe’s social fabric is constantly under siege due to extensive 
networks of human traffickers and people smugglers from the Middle East and Africa, for 
example, is an argument that has been used to justify further militarization and heightened 
security at the expense of border countries. This perception is detrimental not only because it 
undercuts the abuse suffered by true victims of human trafficking, but by placing people 
smuggling in the same category, it criminalizes a large swath of migrants and keeps the lines 
blurred between the guilty and the innocent, who belongs and who does not. Differentiating 
between human trafficking and people smuggling serves as an introduction to the analysis in 
terms of policies that address smuggling specifically and how they can be improved.  
A 2015 report commissioned by the EU highlights the pervasiveness and relevance of 
people smuggling in recent years, stating that every one of the irregular migrants who entered the 
EU that year bought the services of a smuggler at some point before their arrival.1 Highlighted in 
this paper are the regions of Nimruz, Afghanistan and Agadez, Niger, which have been used as 
smuggling hubs as early as the dawn of the Silk Road. Their geostrategic locations as migration 
intersections allow for already prolific people smuggling operations to truly explode by 
expanding and streamlining ancient routes and crossing points with modern technology and 
communication. This comparison seeks to complicate people smuggling as a stabilizing regional 
industry and to indicate how its expansion connects three continents through human movement. 
1
Chuen: People Smuggling in Afghanistan and Niger:  Iatrogenesis and Europe’s “Migration Crisis”
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2019
 
The comparison between Afghanistan and Niger in this way problematizes the EU’s border 
policies, suggesting a starting point for a solution for migrants and for receiving countries.     
In an attempt to discover why and how these parallel migrant flows have bourgeoned 
simultaneously without interaction or communication between them, as well as the direct 
correlation between European policies and increasingly sophisticated smuggling operations, it is 
imperative to note the deep entrenchment of the smuggling industry in both Afghanistan and 
Niger. Combatting people smuggling with militarization and securitization historically results in 
instability, triggering a negative ripple effect for migrants throughout the region. The following 
challenge must therefore be seriously considered: continuing Europe’s protectionist border 
policy and failing to consider other courses of action—in terms of addressing existing smuggling 
operations specifically—may force the Nigerien and Afghan economies to become even more 
dependent on the smuggling industry while Europe’s migration crisis would not be mitigated in 
the long or short term. Contrarily, if new policies protecting only European interests are 
implemented with no viable or sustainable alternatives in either Niger or Afghanistan, the 
immediate regional effects will be detrimental. This is already evidenced by increasingly fatal 
border crossings and higher migrant death rates—in 2017, one in forty-two migrants died in the 
Mediterranean Sea attempting to reach Europe via North Africa.2 Given that previous policies 
regarding people smuggling tend to focus on curbing irregular migration in general, this paper 
argues that short-term action against smuggling, in particular, should recognize the value of local 
and international collaboration aimed at rendering it a comparatively less profitable profession, 
while establishing a path to long-term regional stabilization. As a conceptual and comparative 
study, recognizing the similarities between these migratory flows not only provides a policy 
guideline that could be beneficial to both countries, but recognizes the inextricable relationship 
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between the EU’s border policies, people smuggling, and human movement in terms of mutual 
intensification. 
“Human Trafficking” versus “People Smuggling” 
 For the purposes of this essay, differentiating and defining human trafficking and people 
smuggling is paramount, particularly in light of their interaction and overlap. People smuggling 
itself was only truly analyzed and defined as separate from human trafficking in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.3 
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), human trafficking refers to the coerced recruitment or movement of vulnerable 
persons through the abuse of power or position with the express intention of exploiting them for 
profit, commercial or otherwise.4 Human trafficking can and may be linked to terrorism, but they 
are not inherently related. The UN has nevertheless noted its increased use by terrorist 
organizations as a strategy to “spread terror and advance ideology, intimidate populations and 
decimate communities, institutionalize sexual violence and slavery, [and] incentivize and bolster 
recruitment.”5 Alternatively, the UN Smuggling Protocol defines people smuggling as “the 
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the 
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident.”6 At the local level, this is usually facilitated through kinship or ethnic ties, regardless 
of migrants’ social status, where exploitation is a risk but not a rule.7 Smugglers demand a fee in 
exchange for their services, which is usually agreed upon before travel and is paid after the 
voyage. Both human trafficking and people smuggling are illegal by UN’s standards.8 They can 
also both be affiliated with drugs or arms trafficking, however respecting the scope of this essay, 
those ties will not be discussed.   
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The consequences revealed by defining these terms are three-fold: one, even though 
people smuggling can lead to human trafficking that may fund terrorist activities, these are all 
separate categories complicated by their increased interaction; two, the stigma surrounding 
migrants and the EU’s tendency to emphasize smuggling as a main reason to securitize borders 
deepens the artificial conflation of migrants and terrorists, leading to support for policies that 
actually just aim to stem unwanted migrant flows; and three, “protecting” the EU’s borders by 
way of securitization and militarization directly increases the risk of smuggled migrants falling 
into the hands of traffickers and/or terrorist organizations—the exact opposite of what the EU 
should encourage. It is a counter-productive strategy meaning to protect the “European” 
population, yet while attempting to do so, terrorist organizations’ and traffickers’ profit and 
expand. If terrorism is one of Europe’s true concerns regarding migration, then the EU should 
seriously consider how stemming human movement has been proven to strengthen such 
organizations as they are forced to evolve. 
“Refugees” Versus “Migrants” 
Another differentiation crucial to understanding migration in the regions of Agadez and 
Nimruz concerns “refugees” as a sub-section of “migrants.” A migrant, by definition, is a person 
that moves from one place to another, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, whether across 
international borders or within a country. A refugee is a migrant who has crossed an international 
border and whose claim for asylum has been accepted in a country other than their country of 
origin; this gives refugees physical protection and legal security from the receiving country.9 
Since becoming a refugee usually represents the ending of a voyage to escape conflict, political 
oppression and/or persecution, smugglers are not aware of migrants’ statuses at their time of 
travel—nor will refugees, once their claims have been accepted, be obligated to use smugglers 
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anymore as the receiving country arranges their travel. Being a refugee means, among other 
things, having legal status in another country; being a migrant is much more precarious and, by 
definition, is a general description of a person on the move. A migrant who may later become a 
refugee will be subject to the same conditions as another migrant who may not become a refugee 
given this chronology. Therefore, their labels are categories that do not correspond to a 
difference in treatment by smugglers. 
Ancient Routes, New Borders 
 As a topic of study and research, people smuggling has a rather short literary history. It is 
also still quite difficult to find accurate information on smuggled migrants given the multitude of 
network connections they may make and their deliberate furtiveness to this effect. Significant 
gaps in knowledge over the last twenty years of scholarship reflect a constantly fluctuating and 
expanding industry, namely in terms of the level of corruption, money transfer systems, how 
routes are connected, and the decentralized business model used by smugglers.10 For example, 
Toktaş barely mentions the extensive, informal money transfer system used by migrants and 
smugglers in both the Middle East and the Sahel-Sahara region in his 2002 published research 
2002.11 Fourteen years later, Tinti and Reitano note that this anonymous banking system is 
actually called hawala, which has existed regionally for centuries.12 For legal and bureaucratic 
reasons, smugglers and other criminals prefer hawala as it is a cross-border honor system 
facilitated by family, tribal, and ethnic ties, and there is no paper trail.  
 People smuggling is hardly a new phenomenon, as human movement is characteristic of 
both regions in this study. Tinti, Westcott, and Monsutti all mention that the inhabitants of 
Afghanistan and Niger are historically nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples who specialize in 
transporting themselves, others, and their goods through their respective territories.13 Decades of 
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political instability, lack of economic opportunity, environmental and ecological extremes, and 
increasingly narrow legal entry to Europe have made people smuggling one of the most lucrative 
industries in both Niger and Afghanistan.14 Nimruz and Agadez became migration hubs through 
a different set of historical processes, however their current operations have several fundamental 
similarities.  
 Afghans, for example, have been smuggling economic migrants in concert with Iranians 
and Pakistanis for centuries, and their business operations and contacts may now be passed from 
father to son as a growing number of asylum seekers demand safer, cheap passage to Europe 
through violent areas.15 Jones traces constant political, economic, and social instability followed 
by political collapse as early as the Cold War and the Soviet-Afghan War, prompting a massive 
influx of refugees to Iran and Pakistan in the late twentieth century.16 Until the early 1990s and 
the Afghan Civil War, Afghans were issued “green cards,” which allowed them access to Iranian 
healthcare, education, and residency. However, any newcomers after that point were considered 
undocumented and risked deportation without access to any public services.17 At that point and 
until 2014, Afghans comprised the greatest number of refugees in the world according the 
Human Rights Watch.18 This was the foundation of a precarious, diasporic population caught 
between international interventionism, terror, and inter-ethnic conflict.  
Meanwhile, the Taliban seized control of the Afghan government, establishing a hostile, 
radical, and—because of the “First and Second Worlds”—highly militarized regime 
environment.19 Following the Taliban’s resurgence between 2005 and 2007, over 6 million 
Afghan refugees were documented in both Pakistan and Iran, fleeing not only terrorism but the 
international powers seeking to eradicate it.20 Fifty percent experienced cycles of voluntary and 
coerced repatriation between 2012 and 2016; Ahmadi and Lakhani then confirmed a rise in 
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Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as returning Afghans found parts of their country unlivable, 
infertile, and impoverished.21 Since 2016, Afghanistan’s unemployment rate has hovered around 
9 percent, with 39 percent of people living below the poverty line and 11 million facing food 
insecurity.22 Speigel further explains that only three million of sixteen million Afghans eligible 
for work are actually working.23 Regional migration has historically served as a viable solution, 
yet as of 2015, approximately 3,000 Afghans have entered Iran daily in an attempt to pass 
through to Europe.24 The traditional labor cycles between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that 
once served as buffers for the Afghan economy have been disrupted to the point where informal 
activities are often more stable than legal ones.  
Niger has had similar issues with the rise of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 
Mali as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria in 1997 and 2002 respectively.25 Not only do they 
threaten stability in Niger, but they are a driving force behind refugees and migrants leaving 
conflict and war zones in West and Central African countries. The end of the twentieth century 
and the Cold War marked the beginning of what Bourgeot calls an “economic war” in Niger over 
international control of energy resources such as uranium and petroleum.26 Concurrent structural 
adjustment programs especially damaged Niger’s economy as gold and uranium mines closed, 
and regional instability greatly weakened their nascent tourism industry. The Sahel and Sahara 
also became a testing ground for French and American military technology in the early twenty-
first century, while the US began training African soldiers for the “Global War on Terror” as 
early as 2002.27 These extractive and military training measures continue today, and Bourgeot 
suggests that international powers still largely concern themselves with arms and drug trafficking 
without sustained interest in the people smuggling industry itself.28 The majority of international 
policies concerning human movement in the Sahel-Sahara region have aimed at reducing 
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irregular migration without specific concern for smugglers, their networks, and how they 
function.    
Niger’s people smuggling industry then exploded as Tinti and Westcott indicate, 
following the fall of Mummar Gaddafi’s Western-friendly regime in Libya in 2011 and the 
arrival of Syrian refugees to North Africa as early as 2012.29 Political instability and widespread 
corruption in an EU border country allowed smugglers to not only take advantage of Syrian 
purchasing power, but also to establish connections and build networks that “unspooled 
backwards,” connecting old routes and creating new ones.30 Five thousand migrants passed 
through Agadez per month in 2013 on the “Central Route” linking Niger and Libya.31 Although 
Niger officially criminalized people smuggling in 2015—not coincidentally the same year that 
Europe pledged 650 million euros to curb migration from Niger—the Nigerien central 
government was more than reluctant to damage one of its main sources of income: bribes paid by 
smuggled migrants.32 The local population and smugglers insist that the current political 
economy is unsupportable without the income generated by such operations and have therefore 
stressed its necessary stabilizing power.33 
Smuggling as a Business 
People-smuggling networks exist and thrive where legal avenues for safe passage are either 
absent or inaccessible. They provide a service, albeit illegally, through “a system of 
institutionalized networks with complex profit and loss accounts, including a set of institutions, 
agents and individuals, each of which stands to make a commercial gain’ and [is] subject to 
powerful market forces.”34 As stated above, every migrant from an EU report admitted to being 
smuggled for some part of their journeys in 201535; this means that smugglers, in every form, 
have been facilitating transit through a myriad of countries, helping millions escape their homes 
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and/or search for new opportunities. Yet merely regarding smuggling as a business-like “service,” 
as Tinti, Reitano, and Koser problematize, risks professionalizing smugglers who often 
disrespect migrants’ basic rights and dignity.36 It also ignores migrants’ personal motivations and 
the social networks essential to trans-continental migration.37 Nevertheless, smuggling 
organizations function as informal businesses in the sense that there are occupational hierarchies, 
specialization (especially in intelligence and counterfeiting), sophisticated technology and 
communication, and often fierce competition between rivals.  
 The size and scope of a smuggling operation depends on the complexity of the service 
demanded, the availability and cost of “specialists” and connections, and the overall risk 
involved. Smaller organizations manage shorter or simpler routes that require relatively low 
specialization and lower risk of consequences for illegal activity and financial loss.38 A smuggler 
in this sector is constantly in competition with others capable of providing the same service at a 
similar price, so they are mainly “opportunists,” as Tinti and Reitano observe, usually with other 
business activities on the side.39  
 In terms of small-scale smuggling through Agadez, Niger, the main ethnic group 
controlling human movement are the Toubou, a non-Arab, generally economically disadvantaged 
tribe native to northern Niger, Chad, and southern Libya.40 Survival of their communities 
depends on the smuggling industry, and as Molenaar’s research describes, the Toubou have 
recently succeeded in weakening rival smuggling operations, namely the Tuareg, to this effect.41 
Although the Tuareg are a larger ethnic group and control an expanse of territory better-suited to 
the “Central Route” (between northern Mali, Niger, southern Algeria, and southern Libya), civil 
war and political instability made them vulnerable to Toubou opportunists.42 Known for driving 
Toyota pick-up trucks with up to thirty-five people aboard, the Toubou now have a monopoly on 
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transit within the Niger-Libyan corridor, but risk serious consequences if they operate outside 
their territory.43 Once at the Libyan border, migrants usually pass to one of many Arab-Libyan 
tribes (mainly the Gaddafa, Warfalla, or Magarha), who take charge at the territorial border with 
the Toubou and facilitate an international border crossing at Sebha in southern Libya.44 Tinti and 
Westcott add that dual-smuggling—transporting migrants to a meeting point and returning with 
other goods (both licit and illicit)—is not a focus for the Toubou due to high risks, but the Arab-
Libyan tribes are well-known for it.45 In this way, the Toubou, Tuareg, and Arab-Libyan tribes 
all exemplify the role of small-scale smuggling operations centered on strong connections and 
loyalty to an ethnic group, where there is high competition and low specialization.  
 Larger, trans-national and multi-national smuggling operations, however, resemble the 
model of an organized crime syndicate that is much more difficult to track and dismantle.46 They 
facilitate more dangerous or risky passages, which requires more skill, specialization, 
sophistication, and overall coordination. In this way, condemning every actor complicit in a 
smuggling operation would render complicit every government official that takes bribes or funds 
them, border officials who look the other way, daytime travel agents trying to earn more 
afterhours, the proprietors of hotels that host migrants on their layovers in hubs like Agadez or 
Nimruz, professional counterfeiters or consultants—the list is endless.  
To clarify the complexity of such organizations, Tinti and Reitano divide large 
organizations into three main operative groups: “recruiters and brokers,” “logicians,” and 
“specialists.”47 “Recruiters and brokers” are those who hustle the streets, forming relationships 
among migrants within their ethno-linguistic community and attempting to entice them to use 
smuggling services.48 They are the lowest-level operatives and deal with migrants personally, 
calling them “family” and building their trust.49 The “guides, drivers and skippers; spotters and 
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messengers; enforcers and heavies responsible for discipline and security” are the “logicians.”50 
They comprise the organization’s mid-level and make up the largest part; for Tinti and Reitano, 
this includes transporters, recruiters, intelligence-gatherers, security, hoteliers and landlords, and 
corrupters.51 These two groups are largely dispensable and have variable knowledge of the 
vastness and exact activities of the organization(s) they work for.52 “Logicians” may not all 
belong to the same ethnic group in larger organizations, whereas in smaller ones, they will most 
often form close ethnic alliances and networks.53 “Specialists,” according to Tinti and Reitano, 
are the “escrow holders, money launderers and financiers; the counterfeiters and fraudsters; the 
fixers and corrupters” with varying connections to state institutions.54 These are the people with 
the most power, the most to gain or lose, and the only ones with precise knowledge of how a 
particular organization functions. 
The differences in scope and scale between smuggling operations passing through 
Nimruz, Afghanistan and Agadez, Niger is clear in their delegation of tasks, whether “logician” 
or “specialist.” The Toubou, therefore, are “logicians” on a small scale, where transport via 
ethnic ties is their main occupation and the purpose of security is to protect against rival gangs. 
In and around Afghanistan, and according to Toktaş’s interviews with Kurdish smugglers, 
transporters are “guides” who are experts at weaving through check points and across the Iranian 
border to transport migrants westward.55 However, unlike the Toubou, his job, is to “bring them 
[the migrants] from the border” to a border town near Turkey and nothing more.56 A whole team 
of “logicians” who have no contact with this “guide” will have already arranged his passage: 
“recruiters” targeted prospective migrants at least one week in advance; fees were agreed on and 
paid for through “brokers” or hawaladars57; bribes were paid by a corrupter with contacts who 
got the money from a “cashier” that organizes accounts58; an intelligence-gatherer chose an ideal 
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time to set out given shifting politics and territorial claims; material and basic needs were 
promised through contacts to various trusted hotels and shopkeepers; security of the operation 
(not necessarily the migrants) was assured by young, armed men; and the arms were provided 
through previous deals with other organizations (that are not necessarily licit).  
In comparison, it is therefore much cheaper to benefit from the services offered by 
Toubou tribesmen in Agadez than to seek those available near Nimruz. According to Tinti and 
Westcott, three to four days from Agadez, Niger to Sebha, Libya, the most expensive trip by 
Toyota truck, cost around $360 in 2016.59 However, depending on the documents required and 
travel conditions, the base fee for a trip from Nimruz to Turkey through Iran costed between 
$1,000 and $7,000 as early as 2002.60 Since transporting people from Afghanistan towards 
Europe is considerably more complicated and requires more coordination and security between 
dozens of actors, there is also much less competition between rival smuggling groups. The vast 
network required for such an operation implicates a very strong and deeply embedded crime 
network that employs more “specialists” and has more moving parts and stages.61 This is what 
fundamentally differentiates migration from Agadez and Nimruz. 
One Turkish Kurd explains to Toktaş that “the fundamental rule of capitalism applies 
here; it is a matter of supply and demand” in an economy underpinned by sophisticated schemes 
devised by “financiers, escrow holders, money launderers and their intermediaries.”62 At the top 
of this pyramid are the “arrangers” who oversee and invest in the whole operation.63 Just below 
them are the “counterfeiters” and “fraudsters” charged with the procurement of false passports 
and travel documentation. While not all migrants can afford this option, they are still highly 
valuable members of any trans-national crime organization and can provide the simplest and 
safest travel option.64 “Specialists” are what one Turkish Kurd quoted by Toktaş calls 
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“international smugglers,” meaning those who arrange transport by air, land, or sea, down to the 
individual security personnel at airports.65 They ensure that entry and passage remain open and 
that the migrants are prepared to pay extra money for incidentals along the way (a visa or an 
extra document.)66  
The complexity of smuggling organizations does not lend itself to simple solutions. In a 
decentralized business model of smuggling network systems designed to circumvent formal 
authority, smuggling operations have only evolved and expanded in the last ten years in response 
to growing demand and higher, more dangerous borders en route to Europe. 
Violence and Insurance 
Within and during smuggling operations themselves, there is a tension between a build-in 
insurance system assured by hawaladars and the hawala system and inevitable yet varied 
degrees of violence. Tinti quotes three determinants of violence towards migrants: one, the 
composition and behavior of a country’s smuggling market and services in relation to state 
policies; two, the specificities and strategies of singular organizations; and three, the nature of 
the smuggler-migrant contract in terms of fees paid, enforcement, and honor.67 Essentially 
Tinti’s research proves that the more violence is expected en route, the more security is required 
to protect migrants as financial assets, and the more migrants risk suffering exploitation or 
violence.68 In the case of Niger, competition between rival gangs necessitates more security on 
the smugglers’ part, which makes skirmishes more fatal and total abandonment more and more 
common. Similarly, if the Nigerien state in collaboration with the French decide to enforce 
migration laws more seriously, then the risk of legal consequences and loss of revenue forces 
smugglers to take desperate and violent measures.69 In Afghanistan, smuggling can quickly 
transition to trafficking in prostitution, forced labor, or indentured servitude. Due to the 
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intertwined smuggling networks between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, recruiters may 
promise travel to Europe but instead cheat migrants who cannot escape.  
From a smuggler’s perspective, however, the financial contract between migrants and 
smugglers is binding until the end of the journey because “trustworthy” people are expected to 
keep track of and distribute it appropriately.70 This is the work of those Toktaş calls “middlemen” 
and Tinti terms “intermediaries.”71 In Afghanistan in general, and concerning Afghan migrants 
passing through Nimruz, “middlemen” will be of the same ethnic and linguistic origin depending 
on the tribe.72 Other ethnic groups, such as Turks, have been competed out of this system as they 
had become known to deceive and financially exploit migrants for larger profits.73  
As mentioned in the introduction, the preferred smuggler-migrant transaction system is 
called hawala, also known as an “alternative remittance system (ARS).”74 The “trustworthy” 
people are referred to as “hawaladars or hawala traders,” who earn their commission through a 
series of anonymous transactions based on alphanumerical codes.75 Just like the smuggling 
industry circumvents a narrow and inaccessible legal system, hawala replaces the bureaucracy 
and risk of formal banking institutions. Hawala as a system itself is not illegal, and the majority 
of users are “expatriate communities in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and North America” who 
prefer it because it is cheaper, faster, and can be more reliable than formal bank transactions.76 
However, terrorists and other parties interested in laundering money or passing it to international 
partners without trace, smugglers in this case, have been using it more and more frequently.77 
This is integral to migrant-smuggler relationships, their contracts, and as Tinti described above, 
the level of violence that migrants will experience.78  
From a hawaladar’s perspective, notions of reputation and honor as well as tribal or 
ethnic loyalties help regulate the current and future business relationships he may have, resulting 
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in a well-established honor system that works more efficiently than formal transactions.79 These 
factors may still have an effect on those conducting illicit business with people smugglers, 
however violence or the threat of it is usually more efficient.80 Yet at the same time, as Tinti 
explains, the promise of billions of dollars of potential profit has forced hawaladars and the 
hawala system to innovate and professionalize.81 For example, more sophisticated technology 
and communication allow for instant money transfers via reciprocal payments between two 
businessmen or hawaladars.82 Newer migrant protections catered to the smuggling industry like 
“migrant escrow schemes,” as Tinti mentions empowers migrants against smugglers, protecting 
them through their own reputations.83 This allows migrants a bit of agency, allowing them to 
send and receive money throughout their journeys as well as hold “brokers” and “cashiers” 
accountable to the original contract.  
The value of hawala transfers totaled an estimated $400 billion in 2017 according to Tinti, 
a large part of which accounts for the absorption of billions in smuggling profits.84 As a Turkish 
Kurd describes, a simplified version of such a transaction is as follows: a migrant approaches a 
hawaladar or “cashier” who proposes a price based on the organization he works for, including 
his percentage; once this price is agreed upon, the migrant gives the money to said “trustworthy 
cashier” in exchange for his phone number; the migrant arranges to leave via the transporters 
affiliated with the “cashier;” upon arriving at the destination, the migrant messages the “cashier” 
that they have reached the destination; with this confirmation, the “cashier” pays the transporter, 
himself, and the organization accordingly.85 The threat of mistakes en route is quite serious as in 
this system, as a smuggler could lose his job if he fails to maintain a “trustworthy” success rate. 
The fact that most transactions occur through ethno-linguistic interlocutors also ensures a more 
complete understanding of the contract itself and the reliability of the smuggler. It does not, 
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however, protect against violence along the way or unexpected events that may impede the 
journey, therefore requiring more money transfers and more ambiguous contractual terms. In 
theory, therefore, hawala allows migrants a degree of agency and power, though it does more to 
protect the smuggling operation as a whole than individual migrants.  
Iatrogenesis  
 In order to approach policy from a more theoretical angle, a discussion on the creation of 
global imaginaries is essential. The policies explained below merely perpetuate current global 
inequalities and thus seek to disproportionately benefit Europe at the expense of transit countries 
like Niger and Afghanistan. The basis for this mentality is, as Weber suggests, iatrogenic, which 
renders European powers, the Nigerian and Afghan central governments, the local communities, 
every actor of a smuggling operation, and migrants themselves physically complicit within this 
system.86 Iatrogenesis is in fact a medical term that refers to the promotion of a product or 
service that either does not address the patient’s ailment or contradicts their needs or goals.87 
This term is an ideal medium through which smuggling operations can be made clear.  
In terms of people smuggling, almost every policy implemented thus far has had an 
iatrogenic effect on migrants, transit countries, and Europe itself, because their goals have been 
to further European economic and political interests in Niger and Afghanistan without providing 
alternative economic activities. Inflating the threat of smugglers and obscuring the issue from 
public view, for example, is a dialectical strategy that justifies the policies produced from it. 
Such exaggerated speech rapidly generates support for complete eradication of smugglers with 
little conceptual understanding of the socio-economic and geographical factors forcing migrants 
to choose smugglers more and more frequently. The rhetoric surrounding such policies and their 
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implementation reinforce each other and serve as a feedback loop that lessens the potential for 
meaningful reform.  
 This “spillover” of condemning speech, as Weber argues, negatively effects the entire 
transnational chain of people working within this industry, forcing them to resort to more 
obscure and illegal activities that they may not have entertained otherwise.88 As mentioned in the 
discussion on people smuggling’s occasional overlap with human trafficking and terrorism, there 
is a correlation between higher legal barriers to entry and increased interdependence and reliance 
between these organizations to facilitate even riskier border crossings. Demand for cross-border 
services persists even after legal access is narrowed, and migrants will end up paying more to 
achieve the same end. The central governments of both countries, according to this policy 
framework, are guilty of not only allowing prolific people smuggling operations to exist but also 
of accepting the institutionalized corruption that allows authorities themselves to profit from it. 
While valid, this one-sided, exported mentality is especially detrimental to states like Niger and 
Afghanistan where, for development and structural adjustment purposes, it manipulates the 
global imaginary to legitimate off-shore border policies. Therefore, a combined lack of research 
and policy on smuggling and Europe’s failure to recognize itself a driving force behind the 
system ultimately fuels iatrogenic speech and international policy. Declaring a global war on 
people smuggling only seeks to further support the agenda of a more powerful system while 
relegating policy enforcement to weaker nations who lack the resources to achieve such a 
reversal. As Koser argues, the more secure borders are, the greater the significance of smuggling 
operations.89 
 Born from this mentality was a series of UN protocols. The illegal entry of those fleeing 
persecution, war, or imminent death, is anticipated by the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, yet 
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barriers have risen since then in order to pre-empt the arrival of migrants and asylum-seekers.90 
The 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Smuggling Protocol 
both address the issue in terms of strictly enforced, governmental action focusing on capturing 
and criminalizing individual smugglers.91 While they represent an initial effort by the UN to 
detach people smuggling and human trafficking, both documents reduce smuggling to single, 
isolated events, the management of which is impossible as outlined in the previous section.92 The 
international community’s lack of insight concerning deep socio-economic and political ties 
suggests their ignorance of the intricate interpersonal relationships that represent the industry’s 
true basis. Similar to most organized crime syndicates, smuggling migrants necessitates 
decentralization to the point where each individual smuggler will not know exactly to whom he 
brings his passengers; his obligation is only to transport them from one location to another, 
which, as described above, does not come close to an organization’s “specialists” or investors. 
Catching one smuggler can therefore be considered a job opening for another enterprising 
individual while deflection into another illicit activity is almost guaranteed for the ex-smuggler. 
 With the EU’s recommendation, Niger passed its Law Relative to Illicit Traffic of 
Migrants in 2015 (known as the 2015 Law), which curbed the number of migrants smuggled into 
Libya by allowing for the capture and temporary detainment of Nigerien smugglers.93 One year 
later, the EU bolstered this legislation with its own counter-irregular-migration policy. 
According to Molenaar, it financed and supported the capture and confiscation of 282 
transporters and 168 vehicles in addition to several hotel owners who provided smuggled 
migrants with shelter during their layovers in Agadez.94 The counter-productive and counter-
intuitive effects of this policy reflected the iatrogenic rhetoric that served as its basis. A ripple of 
instability unbalanced the political economy and rendered migrants even more vulnerable to 
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exploitative and expensive transport.95 Widespread repression exacted through local government 
officials further degraded the government’s public image and authority while triggering a sharp 
increase in banditry and militia activity in the Sahara Desert. Molenaar reveals a common 
sentiment among smugglers: that the government practically invited bandits to resume their 
previous activities, forcing them to find alternative ways to subsist given limited opportunities 
and infrastructure for legal employment.96 This drove smuggling networks further underground 
and more dangerous voyages along less-traveled routes increased the likelihood of migrant death 
and abandonment. Clearly, the demand for passage to Europe has remained even as policies have 
attempted to remove individual actors.97  
 Comparatively, the EU and the UN have been much more insistent on combatting 
smuggling in Niger given the shock associated with hundreds of thousands of migrants 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea in recent years. Afghanistan, therefore, is a lower 
priority, which has allowed more sophisticated, organized, and exploitative ways of facilitating 
migrant travel to emerge. This is one of the direct results of Afghanistan’s own protracted 
refugee crisis that started during the Cold War, when Afghans consistently used smugglers to 
escape violence and extremism as outlined by Jones.98 The combination of generations of 
intermixed Afghans, Pakistanis, and Iranians plus the necessary furtiveness surrounding the 
identity of an irregular migrant makes smuggling almost impossible to mitigate or identify 
directly. Given the linearity and dysfunctionality of the policies tested in Niger where smugglers 
are clearly distinguishable, Afghanistan, and particularly Nimruz as a point of intersection, may 
seem too complex a case. Yet migrants passing though Afghanistan still face the same borders, 
the same violence, and the same risks en route to Europe as do those from Niger—a condition 
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that will persist as long as the international community disregards the factors forcing Afghans to 
travel by smuggler.  
 The policy that has had the largest effect on people smuggling in Afghanistan, albeit 
indirectly, has been the repatriation of millions of Afghans living in Iran. Second and third 
generations of Afghans who fled to Iran during the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979-1989, and the 
Afghan Civil War between 1989-1992, have been benefitting from Iranian services, and Iran’s 
strained government has deported hundreds of thousands of them since 2012.99 They hoped that 
the UN might provide the aid that Afghanistan requires to rebuild itself as well as discourage 
further irregular migration via smugglers into Iran itself.100 Although Iran has signed the 1961 
UN Refugee Convention which protects against non-refoulement (the forced repatriation of 
refugees back into the country from which they fled), as Ahmadi contends, the presumed defeat 
of the Taliban justifies their policy.101 This actually seems a violation of non-refoulement in light 
of the Taliban’s continued existence. Nevertheless, the UN only received half of the $152 million 
it requested, which not only failed to provide proper humanitarian aid for returnees and an 
increasing number of IDPs, but systematically ruled out any action against smuggling or 
irregular migration.102   
 The results have been as iatrogenic as those in Niger: young men are especially 
vulnerable to radicalism, extremism, and most significantly, terror recruitment. An unstable 
government incapable of reconciling the inter-ethnic conflicts that ripped the country apart 
originally has little to no legitimacy in the face of an extremely profitable and embedded 
smuggling industry. The exploitation of Afghans returning to a precarious living environment 
has increased as well, forcing potential migrants to consider more perilous and expensive 
smuggling options. 
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Essentially, without serious consideration of regional realities, irregular migration fueled 
by people smuggling operations will continue in both Niger and Afghanistan. Short-sighted 
policies furthering Europe’s immediate interests without opening doors to legal economic 
activity in these two regions will continue to aggravate tensions on the border.  
Recommendations 
 Given the complexity and depth of the smuggling industries in both Niger and 
Afghanistan, any recommendation must include both regional and international powers in 
alliance with local communities. As outlined above, a simple, universal solution is unfeasible as 
evidenced by previous policies that failed to address the exigence of people smuggling as a 
business and industry. Expanding on Molenaar’s description of Niger’s Reconversion Plan, this 
paper proposes not only deepening support for it but also using it as a catalyst for policy in 
Afghanistan.103  
 Implemented in 2017, the Reconversion Plan combines the 2015 Law and a local 
initiative designed to simultaneously devalue smuggling as a profession and provide alternative 
employment options to boost local economies. Molenaar indicates that the long-term goal is 
“socio-economic reintegration,” meaning sustained investment in education, healthcare, and 
other infrastructures.104 Helping to reduce the stigma around governmental authority, this plan 
seeks to utilize the expertise and popular support of traditional tribal elders whose role as 
community mediators is expected to eventually provide an access point for local application and 
cooperation.105 This represents the beginnings of microfinance projects in the Agadez region of 
Niger where previous dependence on mining has left little room for economic expansion.  
 Ninety-eight projects have already been accepted and funded with the help of NGOs and 
the UN, and Molenaar insists that further funding and research would hasten the process with the 
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goal of exporting it to neighboring countries.106 Niger is the only country whose constitution 
gives governmental power and representation to tribal elders; therefore in addition to Molenaar’s 
recommendation, this paper proposes that local authorities should act as liaisons, utilizing this 
power and tribal loyalties to reinforce and encourage participation and adherence to the 
stipulations put forth by government officials.107 In this way, local communities and ethnic 
groups might be more accepting of government aid, more trusting of the licit businesses around 
them, and less likely, in theory, to find a life of banditry, smuggling, or violence profitable. 
Furthermore, it will prove that the government is actually investing in its own economy instead 
of succumbing to corruption, whether by smugglers or by greed within the institution. This, 
combined with a sustained effort from the EU and the UN to collaborate with Sahelian 
governments and to invest in similar projects may taper the flow of smuggled migrants in the 
long-term.  
However, given the precipitous increase in trans-Saharan migration, the expansion and 
sophistication of regional smuggling networks, and rampant institutional corruption within the 
Nigerien central government itself, this plan seems far from a resolution. Agadez’s political 
economy and regional smuggling networks are still so interdependent that the government would 
not function on a daily basis without bribes paid by migrants. As Tinti and Westcott rightly 
observe, the Nigerien government therefore has few incentives to curb irregular migration in 
general, smuggling itself notwithstanding.108 Microfinance projects as an alternative for 
communities and tribes who now rely almost solely on people smuggling as a business simply 
requires more time. While it has the potential to have a significant impact over the long term, it 
can only do so in conjunction with other policies. Tinti and Westcott also suggest engaging in 
dialogue with the Toubou, the tribe that controls human movement in the Niger-Libya corridor 
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from Agadez.109 It is easy to agree that the Toubou’s economic and political interests are of 
significance to the issue, however, one must keep in mind that only parties that could initiate and 
facilitate this conversation—the Nigerien, Libyan, and Chadian central governments—would 
require considerable encouragement and political changes that may take years. Ultimately, these 
countries must eventually accept, include, and provide for the Toubou in a way that stabilizes 
their lifestyle like smuggling does now. While this is an important local solution, it will be very 
long term; instead, the Toubou should be included in the microfinance projects suggested by 
Molenaar.110 
Between 2016 and 2020, the EU plans to spend $680 million on developmental assistance 
in Niger, which could be put towards microfinance and anti-corruption programs.111 Although 
this seems promising, Tinti and Westcott critique that this decision was made before migration 
levels increased, and allocation of funds towards “credible alternatives” within communities is 
not and has not been guaranteed.112 Meanwhile, in 2016, the EU spent 17 billion euros on further 
militarization and securitization of its borders via Frontex, their border agency, which can 
increasingly deny migrants entry by threat or use of force.113 This reflects the reality of a Euro-
centric approach to managing migration. Implementing off-shore border policies without 
ensuring that the more stable countries in the region can partially absorb increasing levels of 
migration, or that they even have the resources to do so, openly reveals misplaced intentions. The 
EU’s goal has failed to consider and act on two fundamental premises of migration flows 
towards Europe: one, understanding that regional stability, especially in Niger and Afghanistan, 
is largely based on transnational illegal smuggling organizations that have become so prolific 
and so lucrative that they actually stabilize otherwise tumultuous areas; and two, accepting that 
the people desperate enough to pay for any of the services that a smuggler can provide have no 
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other viable option. This in mind, expecting Niger’s government to curb migration with EU 
funds without recognizing that the government is funded in large part through bribery is short-
sighted and has been proven ineffective. As a case in point, the EU’s 650 million euro pledge to 
the Nigerien government in 2015 neither reduced irregular migration nor resulted in improved or 
strengthened institutional structures seeking to do so.  
Tinti and Westcott therefore reiterate that if the EU truly wants to combat the influx of 
irregular migration and thus people smuggling, the goal must be eventual regional stability.114 
While Molenaar’s recommendation has a local focus, Tinti and Westcott include cooperation 
with North African countries and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS).115 
Establishing a viable and “coherent” government in Libya through diplomatic resources, for 
example, could eventually provide opportunities for some migrants to stay and work. Before the 
Arab Spring in Libya in 2011, the government was stable enough to absorb some of the 
migratory flows headed to Europe; however, now, with terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and 
human traffickers controlling main migration routes in Libya, smuggled migrants have no option 
but to attempt a border crossing into Europe or stay and risk falling victim to much more serious 
and violent criminals.116 Blaming such migrants for being beneficiaries of an illicit service 
therefore incriminates the wrong group of people; renewed government control would actually 
protect migrants in this way by working to eradicate terrorism and trafficking. Another option is 
increased investment and trade between the EU and ECOWAS, a fifteen-country economic bloc 
and a significant trading partner with the EU. It is comprised of generally outward-facing 
economies, however the bloc itself may serve as a starting point for alternative economic 
activities aimed at stabilizing migrants’ origin countries. 
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 In the context of Afghanistan, where smuggling is much more embedded and the central 
government is neither strong enough to support such measures nor prioritizing migration given 
its security situation, the effects and implementation must be slow and gradual. In this way, 
“short” and “long” term solutions concerning Afghanistan must be thought of over a longer 
period of time than Niger—not only because their smuggling industry is more sophisticated, but 
because the EU is much less concerned about Afghan migration flows versus sub-Saharan ones. 
Traditionally, much of the investment would most likely be put towards Europe’s immediate 
neighbors. However, the true issue is not people smuggling as a singular phenomenon, but the 
conditions that have made it necessary. Therefore, in addition to UN support and regional NGOs’ 
provision of humanitarian aid, Afghanistan’s infrastructure must also be encouraged to 
reconstruct itself. Essentially, if Europe wishes to see a long-term reduction in migration from 
and through Afghanistan, it must start investing in UN projects and microfinance projects as 
Molenaar suggests, the goal being regional stabilization as opposed to criminalization of 
smugglers.117 Remaining ignorant of the larger forces driving the people smuggling industry, as 
discussed previously, only reinforces it. Afghans have migrated for centuries to find legitimate 
work, and with those opportunities now increasingly less accessible, other means of legal 
subsistence must be introduced. As in Niger, microfinance projects similar to the Reconversion 
Plan that encourage entrepreneurs to enter the legal, local economy would be a logical step in 
this process, however Afghanistan’s political system must first be approached.  
Naturally, the political climates of both Niger and Afghanistan are unique, therefore an 
identical solution would be too simplistic and ignorant of the infrastructural handicaps 
specifically facing Afghans upon their return to their territory. However, if Niger can serve as an 
example for what inter-clan reconciliation may resemble as a guideline for that process, a plan 
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for Afghanistan can be created to mediate that discussion. Niger is currently the only country that 
constitutionally cedes local power to traditional clan elders as a stable way to include the many 
ethnicities that live within the territory.118 Given the hostility between the three main Afghan 
ethnic groups (the Pashtun, Tajiks, and Hazaras), negotiating a power sharing agreement 
between them will be the prerequisite for any discussion involving the economy. Once there is an 
established body through which international investment can flow, the option to encourage 
microfinance projects may emerge and eventually outweigh the current profitability of people 
smuggling throughout the region. Extractive policies or interests must, by no means, be a 
motivational factor as leveraging unequal wealth and power in the EU’s interest will only 
continue to encourage organized crime in the region, especially people smuggling.  
Conclusion 
Human movement towards Europe via people smugglers proves that Europe’s own long-
term interests are at risk. Its desire to diminish migratory flows from the Sahel and the Middle 
East contradicts current policies that attempt to subordinate these regions by perpetuating post-
colonial and imperialist global divisions. Thus, European introspection is essential to the success 
of any policy concerning people smuggling since an enormous amount—over 17 billion euros—
is being spent “protecting” the continent.119 This paper demonstrates that not only is this a gross 
waste of financial resources, but it is detrimental to both global and European progress to 
continue to valorize outdated ideologies that maintain an obsolete, exceptionalist image of 
Europe.  
People smuggling as an industry represents the ingenuity behind alternative means of 
subsistence when legal avenues narrow. So ingrained are these processes in the Nigerien and 
Afghan political economies that interested policy-makers must first understand the systemic 
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issues facing a disproportionate world, particularly the historical factors that now force migrants 
from these regions to flee. Nimruz, Afghanistan and Agadez, Niger serve as microcosms for 
contemporary global migration where all manner of risk, exploitation, and violence involved is 
calculated and suffered through. Given the general lack of knowledge on people smuggling as a 
topic, their comparison seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding that may inform future 
policy-makers of the risks involved with treating only the symptoms of major phenomena such 
as this. It furthermore underlines blatant global inequality as exemplified by the violence along 
both routes due to increased securitization and militarization of EU borders. People smuggling 
cannot be eradicated without economic alternatives in place, and the long-term goal must be 
regional stabilization if Europe wishes to render the industry unprofitable—and maintain peace 
on its own continent.  
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